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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the deepening presence of
multinationals in emerging markets on the cost of macroeconomic volatility there. We find that
macroeconomic volatility has a potentially large impact on employment and investment decisions
of multinationals producing intermediate inputs in developing countries. This is the case even for
risk neutral multinationals, as their profit function is non-linear due to price and productivity effects.
For industries with costly capacity, the multinationals would tend to invest in the more stable
emerging market/s. Higher volatility of productivity shocks in an emerging market producing the
intermediate inputs reduces the multinationals' expected profits. High enough instability in such a
market would induce the multinationals to diversify intermediate inputs production, investing in
several emerging markets. This effect is stronger in lower margin industries. We identify
circumstances where this diversification is costly to emerging markets. Such a diversification
increases the responsiveness of the multinationals' employment in each country to productivity
shocks, channeling the average employment from the more to the less volatile location, and reducing
the multinationals' total expected employment in emerging markets.
Joshua Aizenman
Department of Economics, UCSC
217 Social Sciences 1
1156 High Street
Santa Cruz, CA  95064
and NBER
jaizen@ucsc.edu  2 
1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the investment patterns of multinationals 
having the opportunity to locate the production of intermediate input in low wage emerging 
markets.  We study the impact of volatility on the patterns of the multinationals’ 
employment and investment, and identify conditions under which multinationals are induced 
to diversify the production of the intermediate input by investing in several emerging 
markets.  Such a production strategy may be viewed as a hybrid of vertical and horizontal 
patterns, and may mitigate the adverse consequences of volatility on multinationals’ 
expected profits.  A by-product of this strategy is increasing the volatility of employment, 
and reducing the expected multinationals’ employment in emerging markets.  In these 
circumstances, greater stability of an emerging market is associated with higher quasi rents.  
Consequently, one expects that the potential diversification by multinationals would increase 
the demand for macroeconomic stability in emerging markets.   
This paper is motivated by the large increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
emerging markets during the last decades.  A good example of this process is Mexico, where 
in 1989-1993, the compensation to manufacturing workers employed by multinationals 
almost doubled (in $US terms), their number increased by about 50 %, and the stock of 
manufacturing FDI almost tripled [see Figure 1, reporting employment, compensation and 
FDI in Mexican manufacturing, 1989-1993].  The large wage gap between the U.S. and 
Mexico suggests that vertical FDI dominates the inflow of FDI to Mexico.1   
A useful paradigm explaining FDI is found in Markusen and Maskus (2001), 
surveying recent studies of FDI that adopt a general-equilibrium trade-theoretic view of the 
multinational.  They also provide a useful overview of a model where firms choose 
endogenously between vertical and horizontal production structures when investing abroad.  
A vertical pattern arises when the multinational firm fragments the production process 
internationally, locating each stage of production in the country where it can be done at the 
least cost.  A horizontal pattern occurs when the multinational produces the same product or 
service in multiple countries.  Markusen and Maskus note that the choice between vertical 
                                                 
1 See Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for further discussion of Mexico's Maquiladoras.   3 
and horizontal production structures depends on country characteristics, such as relative size 
and relative endowment differences, as well as trade and investment costs. 2    
  Most of the trade-theoretic FDI literature [including the papers reviewed by 
Markusen and Maskus (2001)] relies on non-stochastic models.3  Aizenman and Marion 
(2001) showed that volatility tends to encourage horizontal patterns, and discourage vertical 
patterns of FDI.  This was shown in a model where there is an exclusive choice between 
these two patterns of investment.  The present paper extends this approach by allowing for a 
hybrid model, where the multinational considers horizontal investment at the upstream 
stages of a vertical production chain.  Focusing on uncertainty is important because 
emerging markets are characterized by much greater uncertainty than the OECD countries.4     
The results of this paper are consistent with the notion that macroeconomic 
volatility has a large adverse impact on employment decisions and on the profitability of 
                                                 
2 When the industrial-organization approach to trade was first applied to the multinational, 
researchers developed separate vertical and horizontal models to describe firm behavior. See 
Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) for examples where vertical models 
were used; see Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1997) for examples where horizontal ones 
were employed. Eventually, the two approaches were integrated in a “knowledge-capital 
model.” Markusen and Maskus (2001) describe this integrated approach and highlight its 
three assumptions about technology:  
   (a) The location of knowledge-based assets may be fragmented from production;  
   (b) Knowledge-based assets are skilled-labor intensive relative to final production; and  
   (c) The services of knowledge-based assets are joint inputs into multiple production   
         facilities.   
Properties (a) and (b) motivate vertical multinationals, whereas (c) gives rise to horizontal 
patterns.  See Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) for an empirical test of the knowledge-
capital model.  
 
3 See Dunning (1993) for a good overview of the earlier literature.  There are a few papers 
that examine FDI in a stochastic setting. For example, Aizenman (1994) studies the effects 
of exchange-rate volatility on horizontal FDI.  Spiegel (1994) examines the impact of 
sovereign risk on FDI inflows compared to portfolio investment.  Goldberg and Kolstad 
(1995) study the effects of real exchange-rate uncertainty on FDI under risk aversion and 
use U.S. bilateral FDI flows to confirm their prediction that higher real exchange rate 
volatility increases FDI.  Wei (1997) identifies the adverse effects of corruption-induced 
uncertainty on FDI.  Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994) and Blonigen 
(1997) evaluated other links between the exchange rate and FDI, including the wealth and 
relative wage channels. 
 
4 See Hausmann and Gavin (1995). 
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multinationals producing intermediate inputs in emerging markets.  This is the case even 
for risk neutral multimillions, as their profit function is non-linear due to price and 
productivity effects.  For industries with costly capacity, the multinational would tend to 
invest in relatively stable emerging market/s.  We show that higher volatility of 
productivity shocks in an emerging market producing the intermediate inputs reduces the 
multinationals’ expected profits.  High enough instability in such a market would induce 
the multinationals to diversify its production of intermediate inputs, investing in several 
emerging markets.  This effect is stronger in lower margin industries.  Such 
diversification increases the responsiveness of the multinationals’ employment to 
productivity shocks, channeling the average employment from the less to the more stable 
location.  These results stem from the limited substitutability of the various production 
stages in a vertical production mode, and do not hold for the case of a horizontal 
production.  The diversification of intermediate goods production increases the 
multinationals’ responsiveness to adverse shock, reducing thereby the adverse effects of 
macroeconomic volatility on the multinationals’ expected profits, and reducing the 
expected multinationals’ employment in emerging markets. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out the stochastic 
model, specifying the two feasible modes of FDI: a non-diversified production of 
intermediate inputs and a diversified production mode.  We examine the impact of 
productivity shocks on the profits and employment under the two FDI modes.  Section 3 
identifies the conditions leading the multinational to switch from a non-diversified to a 
diversified production mode.  Section 4 concludes, and the Appendix derives some key 
equations used in the analysis. 
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2.  The Model 
We consider a global economy composed of 3 countries, H , F1 and F2, each 
consuming two final goods, Yand Z.  Consumers utility is a semi-additive function of the 
two goods 





Z + = U  ,                  0<δ<1.                          (1) 
 
Henceforth we will refer to country H as the home country, and countries F1 and F2 as the 
emerging markets.  We will assume that, due to reasons outside the present model’s scope, 
the multinational’s final production stage is at country H, whereas the intermediate product 
M would be produced in the emerging markets. 
The supply of labor in each country is inelastic:  
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We normalize the price of good Z to one.  Good Z is produced in all the countries using a 
simple Ricardian technology:  
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Good Y is produced by a monopoly using a vertical production line, where the 
production is fragmented geographically. The final production stage is done in the H 
economy, using intermediate inputs M that are produced in the emerging markets at an 
earlier stage.  Specifically, assume that the intermediate input can be produced in each of the 
foreign countries using a Cobb-Douglas production technology   
   6 
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where   is the labor employed, b  is labor productivity in the foreign intermediate-good 
sector, and   is a mean zero productivity shock in country i, uncorrelated with other 









the services produced by domestic labor using a Leontief technology: 
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where   is the H labor employed in sector Y.  To simplify, we assume that the labor force 
is competitive and homogenous.  An alternative specification would allow labor employed 
by the multinational to supply heterogeneous skills, as in Rosen (1978).  In these 
circumstances, all the infra marginal workers employed by the multinational would earn a 
quasi rent for their skills, and higher multinational employment would increase labor’s quasi 
rent.  See Appendix B for an outline of such an extension.  
y L
In order to focus on the impact of uncertainty, we assume zero transportation costs.  
Hence, proximity to the consumer does not play a role in determining production patterns.  
The intermediate good is produced before the final good.  The monopoly must pre-commit 
the investment strategy prior to the realization of shocks.  The monopoly is risk neutral and 
chooses the production strategy that maximizes its expected profit.  Applying (1), the 
demand for good Y in each country is 
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Hence, the total demand facing the multinational is 3 .  We calculate employment 
and profit for the multinational engaged in vertical FDI, assuming that domestic and foreign 
productivity shocks are observed simultaneously.   
d Y  7 
 
The multinational can follow two production modes:   
I.  Vertical production with no horizontal diversification: intermediate input M is 
produced only in one of the emerging markets.  Henceforth we refer to this 
production structure as mode I.   
II.  Vertical production with horizontal diversification of the intermediate output: the 
intermediate input M is produced in both emerging markets. Henceforth we refer to this 
production structure as mode II.   
The capacity cost of mode I is C.  The capacity cost of mode II is C(1+f); where f is 
the percentage increase in the investment cost due to the diversification of M production.  
The profits associated with the two production modes are 
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where we assume, for concreteness, that in mode I the intermediate input is produced in 
country 1.  
We proceed with the analysis in three stages: first, we study the case of pure vertical 
production (mode I).  Next, we study the case of vertical production with diversification of 
the intermediate output (mode II). Finally, we contrast the two in order to determine the 
conditions explaining the choice of production mode made by the multinational.  
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2.1  Vertical production, without diversification. 
To fix ideas, we assume that in mode I the multinational invests in country one.  In 
the Appendix we show that the multinational’s expected profits and employment in the 
emerging market are  
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η
φ .  The term φ  measures competitiveness, and is bounded 
between zero (monopoly with unitary elasticity of demand) and 1 (prefect competition).  
Increasing φ  implies more elastic demand, reducing thereby margins.5  The term  I k  is a 
constant.  The weights  * ; I I θ θ  reflect the share of labor cost of each country, as is 
determined by the productivity and the wage of the two countries.6 The term  is the 
demand for labor employed in producing M when all shocks are zero.   
0
, M L 1
 
Expected employment, Expected profits and foreign productivity shocks 
  We turn now to evaluate the impact of random productivity in the emerging market 
on expected employment and expected profits.  For notation simplicity, we assume equal 
                                                 
5 Applying (7), the margin is determined by  φ φ / ) 1 ( 5 . 0 / ] [ − = − y y P MC P . 
6 Equation (10) assumes that the production of M takes place after the realization of 
productivity shocks in both locations.  If the production of M takes place before the 
realization of the domestic productivity shock, the expected profit is 
. The main results hold for either 
scenario.  
C E E k E I I I I − + + + = Π − − ] } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 [( [{ ] [ 2 *
1
* 2 ε θ ε θ −φ
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labor cost shares:  5 . 0 * = = I I θ θ , and assume stable productivity in country H.  A second 
order Taylor approximation of (10) and (11) implies that  
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where  z V  stands for the variance of variable z.   Applying the above we characterize the 
profits and employment under mode I: 
 
Proposition 1:   
a.  More volatile productivity shocks in the emerging market producing M 
reduces the multinational’s expected profits.  
b.  If the margins are low [i.e., if the demand for the final product is 
relatively elastic,  3 > η ], higher volatility of shocks in the emerging 
market reduces the expected employment in sector M. The opposite 
holds for high margin industries.   
 
2.2  Vertical production, with intermediate input diversification (mode II). 
Intermediate input diversification implies that the multinational will allocate the 
employment between the two emerging markets in order to minimize the cost of production.  
The resultant expected profits and employment are (see the Appendix for further details):  
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, and    is the demand for labor employed by sector M in 
country 1 under the diversified production, when all shocks are zero.    For notation 
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Applying (12) and (13) we infer that the second order approximation is: 
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It is easy to verify that for  1 0 ≤ ≤ δ ,  .  0 2 ; 0 1 > > a a
Applying the above we characterize the profits and employment under mode II: 
 
Proposition 2:   
- Higher volatility of productivity shocks in the emerging market ( or  ) reduces the 
multinational’s expected profits.  
*
1 ε *
2 ε  11 
- The direct employment effect of volatility is negative: higher volatility of productivity 
shocks in emerging market 1 reduces the expected employment in sector M in that economy, 
independently of the elasticity of demand for the final product.  The cross effect of volatility 
on employment is positive: higher volatility of productivity shocks in emerging market 2 
increases the expected employment in emerging market 1.  This follows from the 
observation that diversification increases the responsiveness of the multinational to 




  We turn now to a comparison of the two production modes, focusing on the impact 
of productivity shocks in the emerging market. 
 
3.  The choice of production mode and the volatility of productivity shocks. 
 
  Proposition 1 implies that if the multinational would choose to produce the 
intermediate product M only in one location, it would choose the more stable emerging 
market.  In the absence of volatility, the multinational’s rate of return in the production 
mode I is denoted by ρ:  
1 − =
C
kI ρ .   
Appling this notation to (10’) and (12’) we infer that the multinational would prefer 
diversification (production mode II) if the percentage increase in the capacity cost, 
normalized by the rate of return ρ, falls short of the increase in expected profits induced by 
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Equation (14) allows us to characterize the conditions inducing the multinational to diversify 
the production of M: 
 
-  When productivity is stable, production mode II is preferable only if the percentage 
increase of the investment cost induced by the diversification, discounted by ρ, falls short of 




φ [ .  This condition is less likely to 
hold for high margin industries, where φ is closer to zero. 
-  With volatile production, the gains from diversification are higher in more 
competitive industries, and 
*
1 5 . 0
3
1
; 0 ; 0 / 1 | 0 | ε φ φ φ V G G d dG + = = > = = .         (15)   
In perfectly competitive industries, the diversification mode would be preferred if the 
percentage gain in profits attributed to the extra capacity (1/3), plus the gain associated with 
mitigating the exposure to volatility in the first emerging market (half the variance of 
productivity) exceeds 
ρ + 1
f .  




, the multinational would prefer mode I, producing M in 
country F1.  In these circumstance the effect of higher volatility of productivity in F1 is 
summarized by the following statement: 
 
Proposition 3:  
 
Higher volatility of productivity shocks in the emerging market producing M increases the 
likelihood of M diversification.  This effect is stronger in lower margin industries [i.e., 
where φ is closer to one].  Higher volatility of the second emerging market reduces the 
likelihood of M diversification.  The diversification of intermediate goods production 
reduces the expected multinationals’ total employment in emerging markets.     13 
Explanation: 
Note that  
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More volatile productivity in the country producing M reduces the multinational 
profits under both modes.  Yet, the drop in profits is larger in the non-diversified mode. 
Hence, diversification provides a natural hedge against volatility.  This effect is lower in 
high margin industries; as the price adjustment induced by the drop in output due to adverse 
shocks mitigates the drop in profitability.  For high enough volatility and low enough 
margins, the multinational prefers the M diversification mode.  Unlike the case of mode I, 
with diversified production, higher volatility reduces the expected employment in producing 
M independently of the elasticity of demand.   
The decline of the expected multinational’s total employment in emerging markets 
induced by M diversification reflects the trade off between capital and labor, and holds for 
all η.7  The diminishing marginal productivity of labor and the downwards sloping demand 
facing the multinational implies that diversification induces the multinational to increase 
total output.  This is accomplished by relying more on capital and less on labor services.    
 
 
                                                 
7 This point can be illustrated by noting that in the absence of uncertainty, the ratio of the multinational’s total 
employment in the emerging markets in mode II compared to mode I  is  .  The 
corresponding ratio of Y production in mode II compared to mode I  is [  [see Appendix A for 
further details].  Adding uncertainty does not change the qualitative nature of these results. 
1 ] 3 / 4 [ 5 . 0
) 2 /( 2 <
−δ
1 ] 3 / 4
) 2 /( 1 >
−δ  14 
3.1 Simulation 
  
  We close our discussion with two simulations.  Figure 2 corresponds to the case 
where the demand for the product is relatively elastic (η = 4).  The top panel reports the 
expected profits, net of the investment cost, drawn against the standard deviation of the 
productivity shocks impacting country F1.  This is done for the simplest distribution, where 
the future productivity may be high or low, with equal probability.  The bottom panel reports 
the expected employment in country F1.  The solid lines in Figure 2 correspond to the mode 
I  [pure vertical production], whereas the dotted line corresponds to mode II [vertical 
production with M diversification].  The expected profits are reported as a fraction of 
mode’s I profits in the absence of volatility.  
  Similarly, the expected employment is reported in the lower panel as a fraction of the 
employment in mode I, in the absence of volatility.  For low volatility, mode I is superior to 
mode II.  As the volatility of the emerging market increases, both the expected employment 
there and the multinational’s expected profits decline.  For high enough volatility, the 
multinational would diversify the production of the intermediate output.  The volatility 
threshold inducing diversification corresponds to the vertical broken line.  The 
diversification reduces sharply the employment in sector M in the country where M was 
produced exclusively, F1.  It has also the effect of reducing the responsiveness of the 
expected profits and employment to further increase in volatility.  Figure 3 reports the 
simulation for the case where the demand is relatively inelastic (η = 1.33).  The overall 
effect of volatility is similar to the one in Figure 2, with the exception that higher volatility 
increases initially the expected employment in mode I, though this effect is very small.  As 
in Figure 2, for high enough volatility the multinational would diversify the production of 
the intermediate input, cutting sharply the employment in sector M in F1.   
  Note that in both cases (Figures 2 and 3), the diversification reduces the total 
multinational’s employment in the emerging markets.  Hence, the expected employment and 
income gains of country F2 fall short of the losses of country F1. 
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4. Concluding  remarks 
 
                This paper focused on the impact of volatile productivity on the multinational's 
production patterns in emerging markets.  This was done for the case where the 
multinational fragments the production -- the final output uses intermediate inputs produced 
in a low wage emerging market.  We show that higher volatility in the emerging market has 
adverse consequences on the multinational‘s profitability, as well as on the expected 
multinational's employment in the emerging market.  Consequently, the multinational will 
opt to invest in more stable emerging markets.  High enough instability in the emerging 
market producing the intermediate input would induce the multinational to diversify the 
production location.  This strategy will increase the footlessness of the multinational, 
channeling the expected employment from the original producer of the intermediate product, 
to the benefit of other emerging markets. 
  A simplifying assumption allowing more tractable analysis was that the labor force is 
competitive and homogenous.  A draw back of this assumption is that employment changes in 
sector M (the intermediate input) do not impact the welfare of the emerging market.  This result 
can be easily modified, so that higher employment by the multinational is welfare enhancing.  
For example, if the labor is heterogeneous in the skills employed by the multinational, all the 
infra marginal workers earn a quasi rent for their skills [see Appendix B for a review of this 
extension].  This rent increases with multinational employment.  Alternatively, if the labor is 
unionized, it will obtain part of the rents.  In both cases, higher expected employment by the 
multinational would be associated with larger labor’s quasi rents, increasing the GNP.  Finally, 
the paper’s model can be extended to allow for a large number of multinationals’ activities with 
heterogeneous supply and demand conditions.  It can be shown that, in such an extended 
model, higher volatility in a developing country is associated with a drop in the FDI inflow to 




A.  The purpose of this Appendix is to derive several equations used in the paper. 
Mode I, Equations (10)-(11) 
Substituting (5) - (7) into (8), we find that  
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where Ydenotes the consumption level in each country.  The first-order condition 
characterizing optimal output ( ) Y
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The profits can be rewritten as 
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 Applying (5) and (6) and (A2) we infer that  
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where  is the demand for labor employed in producing M when all shocks are zero.  
Equations (10) and (11) follow from (A3) and (A5). 
0
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Equations (12), (13). Mode II 
The multinational determines the employment in the two emerging markets by 
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The first-order condition characterizing the optimal output ( ) Y
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 and the resultant profits are 
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The profits can be rewritten as 
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Applying (9) and (A7) we infer that the employment in the foreign country is  
 

















* 2 , 0
1 ,
*
1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 (
) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 (
λ ε λ ε
ε









M M L L      
         (A11) 
 
where   is the demand for labor employed in sector M in country 1 under the diversified 
production, when all shocks are zero.  Equations (12) and (13) follow from (A10) and 
(A11). 
d
M L , 0
1 ,  19 
 
B.   The purpose of this Appendix is to extend the paper’s model to the case of 
heterogeneous labor in the emerging market.  This is done by reinterpreting the labor 
employed in sector M,  , implementing Rosen’s (1978) aggregation of heterogeneous 
skills.  Specifically, suppose that a worker j in country i can supply  effective labor 
services in sector M, and 1 unit of labor service in sector Z.  The Ricardian technology in 
sector Z implies that the wage in that sector is a , whereas the wage in sector M, dented by  
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Let the density function of skills in sector M be , measuring the number of workers 
whose skills can yield labor services of l in sector M.  A worker j would supply effort to 
sector M if  
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Hence, the total labor services supplied to sector M at the given relative wage  is the sum 
of all the supply of workers whose productivity in M exceeds the relative wage: 
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Recalling that the wage in sector Z is given by a , we can solve (B3) to infer the wage in 
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Equations (1)-(7) continue to apply.  The multinational’s problem is modified to account for 
the endogenous determination of the manufacturing wage.  Specifically, the multinational is 
maximizing the expected value of (8) and (9) (in modes I and II respectively), with the 
added constraint that the wage in sector M is linked to the employment in that sector via   20 
(B4).  All the qualitative results of the paper continue to apply, with the modification that 
the GNP of the emerging markets depends positively on the employment in M.   
Specifically, the GNP in country i is  
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Higher employment in sector M requires higher wages there, needed to attract the 
marginal worker from Z to M.  This wage hike increases the ‘quasi rent’ of all the 
inframarginal workers that are already employed in that sector, increasing thereby the GNP.    21 
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Figure 1 
Multinational Manufacturing employment, investment and compensation, 1989-1993 
Source: Measuring Globalization, The Role of Multinationals in OECD Economics, 2001 





































Volatility, expected profits and expected employment in F1 - low margins 
The expected profits are reported as a fraction of the mode I profits in the absence of 
volatility. The expected employment are reported as a fraction of the employment in mode I 
in the absence of volatility. 
Drawn for the case where  .  3 . 0 ; 25 . 0 ; 1 ; 4 . 0
*
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Figure 3 
Volatility, expected profits and expected employment in F1- high margins 
The expected profits are reported as a fraction of the mode I profits in the absence of 
volatility. The expected employment are reported as a fraction of the employment in mode I 
in the absence of volatility. 
Drawn for the case where  .  3 . 0 ; 25 . 0 ; 1 ; 4 . 0
*
2 ; 25 . 0 = = = = = f C A ε δ
 
 
 